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The Shortcomings of Corporate Accountability in Post-Conflict Colombia: Land, Rivers
and Animals
By: Isabella Ariza Buitrago1 and Luisa Gómez Betancur2

Abstract
Harms resulting from a fifty-year-old conflict in Colombia were out of all proportion. Clashes
between organized armed groups, such as army troops, guerillas, and paramilitary groups resulted
in countless violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. However, the
emergence, degradation, effects and continuation of the conflict have shown that, beyond a clash
of armed groups, the war has been underpinned by a “logic of dispossession, exploitation, and
domination.” This logic used plundering devices over many territories and bodies. In the shadows
of the strife, non-armed actors, such as business people, corporations, and politicians, were also
responsible for and benefited from the war. Economic actors participated in land grabbing, forced
displacement and the fraudulent and illegal possession of the land that historically belonged to
Indigenous People, campesino and afro-communities. This same logic showed that, along with
human bodies “as the first territory targeted for dispossession,” lands, animals, rivers, and whole
ecosystems were severely impacted. Despite this recurring logic and its devices, the transitional
justice architecture is ill-equipped to deal with past and present dispossession, exploitation, and
domination. This Article explains transitional justice’s stringent limitations for delivering justice
and remedy for victims of corporate abuse, such as a weakening anthropocentric and corporatecentric approach that does not properly address harms against territories, rivers, animals, or
ecosystems. However, this piece also reflects on the endeavors that both the transitional justice
institutions themselves and civil society at the domestic and international levels have made to
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effectively respond to the systems of dispossession of the Colombian conflict and, most
importantly, to their victims.

Keywords:
Transitional Justice, Animal Law, Corporate Accountability, Rights of Nature.
“The project before us is not an extensionist one (expanding the definition of the human to allow a few
racialized groups or preferred ape species in) but rather a reconstructive one (reimagining humans,
animals, and nature outside of systems of domination).”
Claire Jean Kim

Introduction
The headline of a Colombian newspaper article reads: “A biologist goes bird-watching with
the men who kidnapped him.”3 The article tells the story of a man that feels hope for the future of
the country and fraternity with former FARC-EP combatants. The article also mentions that
Colombia is the most biodiverse country in the world per square kilometer, reports that fourteen
new species of animals have been discovered in the Amazon region, and suggests that ecotourism
has plenty of potential for enhancing the economy.4 This idyllic view of a post-conflict Colombia
contrasts with the fact that the country continues to have one of the world’s most unfair land tenure
structures, which has led many landless campesinos to colonize environmentally protected areas.5
It is also at odds with the fact that deforestation increased by 44% in 2016, the year the Peace
Agreement between the Colombian government and FARC-EP was signed.6
Many challenges regarding the implementation of the Peace Agreement between the
Colombian government and former guerrilla --now political party-- FARC-EP remain. Although
a paradigm shift in environmental matters is essential for permanent and sustainable peace, and
3

All translations are ours. Pardo Ibarra, Tatiana. “El biólogo que observa aves con los hombres que lo secuestraron.”
El Tiempo. June 1st, 2019. Available at: https://www.eltiempo.com/vida/medio-ambiente/el-biologo-que-observaaves-con-los-hombres-que-lo-secuestraron-369514
4
Id.
5
Note that the opposite phenomenon is also common: local governments have declared as “protected forests” lands
that campesino settlers have inhabited for years. See Ángel, G., Posada, V., Olaya, C., González, L., Sánchez, S.,
Jerez, C., Melo, L. 2019. Lineamientos para la política pública participativa. Parques con Campesinos. Carta Acuerdo
FAO-ANZORC. Bogotá.
6
Further, “Landowners who try to return to their abandoned plots are facing an unexpected problem. Jungles that
were once cleared for farmland grew back during FARC-EP occupation; the government has claimed much of this
land as a natural resource that cannot be used for farming or timber. This has left hundreds of thousands of people
with no source of income if they choose to move back to their land, especially because most of them do not have
papers to prove ownership.” Reardon, Sara. “FARC-EP and the forest: Peace is destroying Colombia’s jungle — and
opening it to science.” Nature. 12 June 2018. Available at: nature.com/articles/d41586- 018-05397-2
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although victims are well aware of the harm and damage that animals suffered during the war,7
transitional justice mechanisms do not focus on environmental justice, and animals are mentioned
only once in the Agreement —to make sure that families have animals in their land—.8 Polluted
land and rivers, and harmed and killed animals are almost completely absent in post-conflict
conversations. Similarly, victims of corporate abuse are not properly represented in the transitional
justice process because its tribunal, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (“SJP”) does not have
mandatory jurisdiction over corporations that participated either directly or indirectly in the
conflict.
A transitional approach to justice after the conflict should recognize that along with armed
groups, non-armed actors, including business people, corporations, and politicians, have also been
responsible for and benefited from the war. By ignoring the role that non-armed actors played
during the armed conflict in Colombia, one might be at risk of simplifying the scope of the harm
or the motivations and vehicles that contributed to the outbreak or continuation of violence. As the
identity of economic actors and their powerful networks are identified in the complex puzzle of
the armed conflict, it becomes clearer that the Colombian conflict can be understood and accounted
for through a logic of “dispossession”9, “exploitation”, and domination”10 over bodies and
territories.
1. Devices of Dispossession, Exploitation, and Domination
The armed conflict attempted to conquer and wound not only human bodies but also nature
and territories. This logic is well-framed by a group of rural women that were victims of gross
human rights violations and participated in storytelling processes with the Colombian Truth
Commission: “The [material] dispossession was accompanied by forces that have intimidated
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Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. Mujeres, coca y guerra en el Bajo Putumayo. Bogotá: Publicaciones
Semana 2012, p. 276. Available at: http://centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/El- Placermujeres-coca-y-guerra-en-el-Bajo-Putumayo.pdf
8
Final Agreement for a Stable and Durable Peace, 2016. “Article 4.1.3.6. a) For the family nuclei of the cultivators
linked to the crops of illicit use: Establishment of home gardens and delivery of minor species with their due technical
support, provision of supplies and food for the animals, according to the preference of each family nucleus.” (“Artículo
4.1.3.6. a) Para los núcleos familiares de los cultivadoras y cultivadores vinculados a los cultivos de uso ilícito:
Establecimiento de huertas caseras y entrega de especies menores con su debido acompañamiento técnico, provisión
de insumos y alimento para los animales, de acuerdo con la preferencia de cada núcleo familiar.”)
9
As conceptualized by Nichols, Robert. "Theft Is Property! The Recursive Logic of Dispossession," Political
Theory 2018, Vol. 46(1) 3–28, available at: https://criticaltheory.northwestern.edu/mellon-project/critical-theory-inthe-global-south/sub_projects/theft-is-property,-nichols.pdf
10
As conceptualized by Ko, Aph and Syl Ko. Aphro-ism: Essays on Pop Culture, Feminism, and Black Veganism
from Two Sisters. Lantern Publishing & Media, 2017.
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campesinas. In addition to the territory, our bodies have also been subject to dispossession and
have been used as weapons of war through sexual violence and other types of violence that left
deep traces in our daily lives. Many women have gone through this situation of feeling that neither
their body nor their land are worth anything”.11 They also refer to forced recruitment of their
children: “When legal and illegal armed actors take away from us our children, this is
dispossession.”12
Plundering and domination devices were used over many territories. Along with human
bodies “as the first territory targeted for dispossession,”13 land, animals, rivers, and whole
ecosystems enlarged the list. All of them were severely impacted by war and, as a result of over
five decades of war, ecosystems and wildlife in Colombia experienced significant environmental
pressures and damage. Remote zones where armed groups settled overlap with the most
biodiversity-rich areas in the country and the world.14 Some investigative reports indicate that in
2013 40 percent of the presence of illegal groups was recorded in National Natural Parks, areas
designated for conservation purposes.15 Camp settlement and the development of illegal activities
in these areas involve the usage and processing of resources, which under conflict conditions could
not be deemed sustainable.16 According to official statistics, 58 percent of deforestation between
1990 and 2013 took place in war zones.17 Among the main identified causes of deforestation are
illegal mining, crops used for illicit purposes, illegal logging, forest fires, and extensive cattle
ranching.18 In the mid-2010s, 56 percent of deforested areas were transformed into grass cover for
livestock activities.19 Land grabbing and the development of extractive projects and agribusiness
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“Nuestros cuerpos, además del territorio, también han sido objeto de despojo”. December 17, 2020. Comisión para
el Esclarecimiento de la Verdad, la Convivencia y la No Repetición. Available at:
https://comisiondelaverdad.co/actualidad/noticias/nuestros-cuerpos-ademas-del-territorio-tambien-han-sido-objetode-despojo
12
Id.
13
Sánchez, M. (2021). Cartografías del despojo: saqueo, explotación y guerra contra los cuerpos afro-campesinos en
los Montes de María (Colombia). Palobra, 21(1), 5-23.
14
Departamento Nacional de Planeación, Bases del Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2014–2018 50 (2015).
15
Los parques: de las balas a la paz, Semana. Sept. 21, 2013. Available at:
https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/los-parques-de-las-balas-la-paz/358371-3
[https://perma.cc/YS3SNYWF].
16
César Rodríguez Garavito et al., La Paz Ambiental: Retos y Propuestas para el Posacuerdo, Dejusticia 19–20 (Jan.
2017).
17
Departamento Nacional de Planeación, Conpes 3850: Fondo Colombia en Paz 15 (2015); Departamento Nacional
de Planeación, Dividendos Ambientales de la Paz 5 (2016)
18
Environmental Investigation Agency, Condenando el Bosque: Ilegalidad y falta de gobernanza en la Amazonía
Colombiana 6, 16 (2019).
19
See Rodríguez Garavito et al., supra note 16, at 29.
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have also accelerated deforestation and degradation of forests.20 Mercury dumping, as a
consequence of illegal gold mining, has polluted water, soil, and air.21 In 2011, Colombia had the
world’s highest per capita mercury pollution.22 According to the UN Environment Programme in
2018, Colombia is one of the highest emitters of the toxic chemical, after Indonesia and Perú.23
There is also severe environmental degradation due to attacks on oil pipelines by rebel groups,
particularly the National Liberation Army (ELN). Since the 1980s, it is estimated that more than
four million oil barrels have spilled over land and water basins, reaching almost 800 rivers and
streams between 2009 and 2015.24 As a strategy of the fight against drugs, herbicides --composed
of glyphosate-- were heavily sprayed by air over illicit crops: about two million hectares have been
sprayed since the mid-1990s.25 Because aerial spraying of this chemical is difficult to perform in
a controlled manner, wildlife and farming activities suffer destruction too. The Constitutional
Court in Colombia has already discussed the negative impacts of these herbicides for human
rights.26
Up until 2014, about 50 percent of towns in the country were impacted by illegal mining,
and extractive activities took place in 28 percent of natural protected sanctuaries.27 Violence in the
most biologically diverse sites in Colombia --such as the Amazon and the biogeographical Chocó
and Catatumbo28-- made conservation activities virtually impossible.29 Armed actors used
strategies such as the placement of landmines,30 killings, and threats against rangers in natural
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Environmental Investigation Agency, supra note 18.
Lorenzo Morales, Peace and Environmental Protection in Colombia: Proposals for Sustainable Rural Development,
Inter-Am. Dialogue 10–11 (2017), Available at: http://www.thedia-logue.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Colombiareport-Eng_Web-Res_Final-for-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/DA38-6FU3].
22
Paul Cordy et al., Mercury Contamination From Artisanal Gold Mining in Antioquia, Colombia: The World’s
Highest Per Capita Mercury Pollution, 410–11 Sci. Total Env’t154, 155 (2011).
23
UNEP & AMAP, Technical background report to the global mercury as-sessment 2018 3–34 (Oct. 2, 2019).
24
Departamento Nacional de Planeación, supra note 17, at 12–13.
25
Ministerio de Justicia y ODC, Reporte de drogas de Colombia 75–79 (2015).
26
See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], mayo 13, 2003, Sentencia SU-383/03; Corte Constitucional
[C.C.] [Constitutional Court], febrero 7, 2017, Senten-cia T-080/17; Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional
Court], abril 21, 2017, Sentencia T-236/17; Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], mayo 8, 2017,
Sentencia T-300/17 (documenting many harms and human rights violations resulting from the aerial application of
herbicides whose active component is glyphosate).
27
Departamento Nacional de Planeación, supra note 17, at 19.
28
See Rodríguez Garavito et al., supra note 16, at 12–13.
29
María D. Álvarez, Forests in the Time of Violence: Conservation Implications of the Colombian War, 16 J.
Sustainable Forestry 47, 63 (2003).
30
Jorge Eduardo Espinosa, Adiós a las Minas en Colombia, N.Y. Times (Dec. 20, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/es/2018/12/20/espanol/opinion/opinion-desminado-colom-bia.html
[https://perma.cc/4ZFW-AY6C].
21
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sanctuaries31 to discourage institutional presence.32 Additionally, the government’s interests are
focused on ending armed struggle, so the military budget is often prioritized above conservation
efforts.33 In 2019, military expenditure was more than 14 times the budget for environmental
protection in Colombia.34 In 2020, it increased to almost 17 times.35 This is a brief account on how
non-humans bodies have also been subjected to plundering devices and how every territory
provides a testimony of the “logic of dispossession, exploitation, and domination” that has
characterized the war in Colombia and behind which corporate abuse has been present.
Jungles, rivers and animals should be protected, not based on a fear of human extinction or
by taking a simple conservationist approach, but rather because they form part of a wide and
complex ecosystem, which affected communities are also a part of. While trying to find ways to
end a fifty-year-old conflict, the Colombian government was able to imagine ways in which former
combatants could be welcomed to mainstream society. But, at the same time, it kept relying on the
same judicial mechanisms that perpetuate corporate impunity. This paper explores some ways to
achieve redress, even when the law seems to be tailored to fit companies’ economic interests and
to leave out restoration for victims of corporate abuse, rivers, animals and land. In the following
pages, we will explore how conflict has benefited extractive economic actors, how post-conflict
appears to continue to do so, and how civil society has organized to find accountability beyond the
official transitional justice mechanisms.
2. Conflict and Extractivism: Rivers, Animals and Corporate Impunity
Like other wars and conflicts, the history of Colombian conflict can be read as an effort to
dominate what is considered wild. Left-wing guerillas and the jungles they inhabited for decades
31

InfoAmazonía, Guardaparques de la Amazonia Salen de áreas Protegidas por Amenazas, El Espectador (Feb. 24,
2020), https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/me-dio-ambiente/guardaparques-de-la-amazonia-salen-de-areasprotegidas-por-amenazas-ar-ticulo-906118 [https://perma.cc/87DR-MDYH].
32
This phenomenon is identified in Jeffrey A. McNeely, Conserving Forest Biodiversity in Times of Violent Conflict,
37 Oryx 142, 148 (2003).
33
This phenomenon is identified in Thor Hanson et al., Warfare in Biodiversity Hotspots, 23 Conservation Biology
578 (2009).
34
According to the budget classification showing types of activities or services in which national funds will be
allocated (“Clasificación Funcional”), in 2019, COP 11,620 thousands of millions (mm) was expended in the defense
sector while COP 788 mm was expended in environmental protection services. Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito
Público,
Presupuesto
Ciudadano
2019
24
(2018),
http://www.pte.gov.co/WebsitePTE/Documentos/PresupuestoGeneralNacion2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4R37762H].
35
In 2020, the above trend remains. Only COP 750 mm is invested in conservation efforts while COP 12,349 mm is
devoted to defense purposes. Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público, Presupuesto Ciudadano 2020 22 (2019),
http://www.pte.gov.co/WebsitePTE/Documentos/PresupuestoGeneralNacion2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FV69QEMH].
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were imagined by mainstream society as just that: wild. Through violent strategies that sometimes
benefited corporate interests, campesinos were dispossessed from their land in rural areas of the
country, making Colombia the country with the highest number of internally displaced people.36
Rivers were consistently and systematically polluted, their water streams were dominated by the
horror of violence and used as avenues to dump bodies and disappear people. All armed actors of
the conflict harmed or used animals in violent ways. This section takes a brief look at those
domination dynamics and shows the ways in which, even after the official end of the conflict,
many of those dynamics persist.
2.1. Extractivism and Land Grabbing
During the pandemic year37, Colombia’s Institute of Hydrology, Meteorology and
Environmental Studies reported that 171,685 hectares of forest, mostly in the Amazon region, had
been destroyed, an increase of over 8 percent compared to 2019.38 Through land grabbing,
economic actors often set up “valuable agricultural operations” such as “cattle rearing and African
palm oil cultivation.”39 This is a decades old phenomenon: before the signature of the Peace
Agreement extractive projects “benefited from the dynamics of dispossession and the rural
development model,” while the government approved the dispossession by “providing a ‘lifeline’
to the corporations that have grabbed state-owned lands (baldíos) illegally.”40 During the peak of
36

Colombia has the highest number of internally displaced people (IDPs), according to the United Nations. See
https://www.unhcr.org/colombia.html. In its annual report, the UNHCR, the agency in charge of monitoring forced
displacement, said Colombia had 7.7 million IDPs.
37
After a harsh pandemic year, more than 43% of Colombians are living in poverty. Earlier this year, protesters took
to the streets demanding changes to tax and labor reforms that would further impoverish the middle and lower classes.
Women, young people, Indigenous communities, Afro-Colombian people, and union leaders demanded Iván Duque’s
government to step up the implementation of the Peace Agreement and guarantee their right to protest. Indigenous
and Afro-Colombian communities fighting against corporations like Cerrejón demanded an end to continuous
harassment and death threats. During the protests, riot police inflicted grave injuries on hundreds of people “under the
pretext of restoring order.” Independent journalists suffered attacks, social justice lawyers were threatened, and union
leaders had to flee the country after receiving death threats. In this context, environmental defenders fighting corporate
abuse, like Jani Silva --who has received several death threats--, are asking for protection. For more detail, see Informe
Final De La Misión De Observación Internacional Por Las Garantías De La Protesta Social y Contra La Impunidad
En Colombia, published in October, 2021, available at: https://ddhhcolombia.org.co/2021/10/07/informe-final-de-lamision-sos-colombia/
38
Instituto de Hidrología, Meteorología y Estudios Ambientales (Ideam). "Boletín de Detección Temprana de
Deforestación (DT-D)". Subdirección de Ecosistemas e Información Ambiental. Sistema de Monitoreo de Bosques y
Carbono (SMByC). Available at: http://documentacion.ideam.gov.co/openbiblio/bvirtual/023891/22BOLETIN.pdf
39
Insight Crime. "Land Grabbing: Tracing and Targeting the 'Invisible' Threat Destroying Colombia’s Forests."
March 25, 2021. https://insightcrime.org/news/land-grabbing-tracing-targeting-invisible-threat-destroying-colombiaforests/
40
"Dispossession and Displacement: Strategies for Orinoquia's Development." Available at:
https://humanidadvigente.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/DESPOJAR-Y-DESPLAZAR-RESUMEN-INGLES2.pdf
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paramilitary violence (1996-2006) more than 3,100 people were killed and 55,000 campesinos
were forcibly displaced. Displacements meant that valuable land became cheap: a paramilitary
combatant declared in a Justice and Peace court that “Everything was done because of the land,
which is rich in coal. This generates a lot of money, that's why all this displacement happened. A
land in conflict is worth nothing: where there are dead and displaced people, one could buy the
hectare for 150 thousand colombian pesos.”41 As a result of the forced and massive displacement,
together with the fraudulent purchase and sale of property, mining companies acquired a
significant part of the land stripped from displaced campesino communities.42
The most explicit symptom of the coincidence between land grabs and the mining boom
in Magdalena Grande43, a region rich in coal, is that a significant part of exploitation licenses
granted to large coal companies currently overlaps with lands claimed by victims of land
dispossession and forced displacement. Drummond, for example, has an exploitation license that
includes 57 properties in Chiriguaná, Cesar. The same US company is also authorized to exploit
an area covering 81 farms known as Mechoacán, Casacará, and El Platanal in Codazzi, Cesar.
Over these lands, victims have filed dispossession complaints. Prodeco, a company that represents
Glencore’s operations in Colombia, owns an exploitation license that covers eight lands with
restitution claims by campesinas and campesinos in El Prado, Los Manguitos, San Rafael, and
Plan Bonito (Cesar). Likewise, Carbones Serranía is a company that was authorized to exploit coal
in an area that includes 25 properties in La Jagua, Cesar, that were allegedly illegally
appropriated.44
Despite the formal demobilization of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
paramilitaries in 2006, the victims of human rights violations, community leaders, and union
activists continue to be threatened, intimidated, and attacked. Neo-paramilitary groups continue to

41

VerdadAbierta.com, 2010, diciembre 13, “La versión de Samario sobre la Drummond y los paras.”
“El desplazamiento forzado no solo fue utilizado como estrategia de guerra, sino que también coincidió con los
intereses económicos tanto de los paramilitares como de las élites económicas locales y las empresas que estuvieron
directamente involucradas en los desplazamientos o se beneficiaron de los bajos precios de la tierra y la garantía de
permanencia en ella” (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2013, 71; Juzgado Adjunto al Juzgado Quinto Penal del
Circuito Especializado de Medellín 2013 cit. in Sánchez, Nelson Camilo et al. Cuentas claras: El papel de la Comisión
de la Verdad en la develación de la responsabilidad de empresas en el conflicto armado colombiano, Dejusticia:
Bogotá, Feb. 2018). Available at: https://www.dejusticia.org/publication/cuentas-claras-empresas/
43
"El Magdalena Grande" is how the region of the Colombian Caribbean coast is known, which runs from the
Magdalena River to the Guajira peninsula and which until the 1960s comprised the current departments of Magdalena,
Cesar, and La Guajira..
44
“La maldita tierra: Guerrilla, paramilitares, mineras y conflicto armado en el departamento del Cesar”. CNMH,
Agosto de 2016. Available at: https://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/descargas/informes2016/malditatierra/la-maldita-tierra.pdf
42

8

operate in Cesar after the Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras was enacted in 2011,
threatening and intimidating “post”-conflict land restitution claimants.
These overlapping patterns repeat in zones currently dominated by extensive cattle
ranching and agribusinesses but that historically belonged to campesino and afro-communities.
This is the case of the Curvaradó and Jiguamiandó afro-communities in the municipality of El
Carmen del Darién that were massively displaced at the hands of a criminal plan hatched by
paramilitary groups, the Colombian National Army, and economic actors. Under counter-terrorist
slogans, military and paramilitary forces broke into their territories and, in joint operations, widely
known as “Cacarica and Genesis Operations,” spread terror and forcefully displaced more than
3,500 people45 in just three days.46 After some years, when many of these afro-communities
attempted to return to their homes, they found cattle ranchers, African palm oil cultivation owners,
and logging businesses taking possessions of the lands through fraudulent and illegal means.
Although Chapter I of the Peace Agreement47 contains a “Comprehensive Rural Reform,”
that intends to alleviate the effects of the conflict and to change the conditions that enabled
persistent violence in Colombia, such as the issue of land access and use, the unfair concentration
of land with agricultural potential, and the exclusion of the rural population from land ownership,
the transitional justice framework that subsequently developed the Peace Agreement fails to tackle
the logic of domination described in this Section. In substance, the law continues to benefit
corporate abuse and law enforcement is weak when it comes to protecting campesinos and their
territories. The absence of transitional mechanisms for corporate accountability and a persistent
corporate-centric approach hinders comprehensive reparation. Colombia’s transitional justice
design left corporations out. As we will explain, some gaps in the law let corporations impune for
profiting, benefiting from, or directly financing the conflict.
The Peace Agreement created a complex transitional justice system which includes the
Special Jurisdiction for Peace (SJP) as its justice component. “One innovative characteristic of the
SJP is that its competence is not limited to state actors and members of armed groups, but also
45

Caso De Las Comunidades Afrodescendientes Desplazadas De La Cuenca Del Río Cacarica (Operación Génesis)
Vs. Colombia. Judgement, Noviembre 20, 2013, at 46. Available at:
https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_270_esp.pdf
46
Cacarica: 23 años construyendo paz. Marzo 13, 2020. Comisión para el Esclarecimiento de la Verdad, la
Convivencia y la No Repetición. Available at: https://comisiondelaverdad.co/actualidad/noticias/cacarica-23-anosconstruyendo-paz
47
Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace, Colom.-FARC-EP-EP, Nov.
24, 2016,
http://especiales.presidencia.gov.co/ Documents/20170620-dejacion-armas/acuerdos/acuerdo-final-ingles.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LF8X-ZR8N] [hereinafter Final Agreement]
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includes [civilians] or third party actors.”48 As it was crafted in the Peace Agreement, the SJP had
the ability to summon civilians, that included politicians and economic actors, such as cattle
ranchers, businessmen, or farmers that although did not form part of the armed forces did profit,
benefit from, or directly financed it. However, in a 2017 decision, the Colombian Constitutional
Court ruled that the mandatory submission of economic actors to the SJP was unconstitutional on
the grounds that it violated their rights to a fair and impartial trial, in particular the principle of the
natural judge.49 Consequently, the court’s solution to this issue was to deprive the SJP of its ability
to summon these actors.50 In a nutshell, the SJP maintains jurisdiction over economic actors only
if they voluntarily present themselves before the system, otherwise they will continue under
jurisdiction of the ordinary criminal justice system. The problem with this outcome is that the
ordinary justice system has historically guaranteed impunity for economic actors, then, the latter
have no incentives to appear before the SJP. “Considering the difficulties and poor results that
have characterized the investigations of the ordinary prosecutors thus far, it seems that few
businessmen will have sufficient incentives to present themselves before the [SJP] and that its
contribution to clarify their role in [violations of human rights or humanitarian law] and hold them
accountable will be rather limited.”51
This outcome set up a discouraging scenario for victims of corporate abuse. Their hope
was rooted in the SJP’s innovative powers to summon economic actors, and, based on the dynamic
of the transitional justice system, to compel them to contribute to justice, truth, reparations, and
non-repetition in exchange for legal benefits. The jurisdiction of the SJP over third party actors, as
originally crafted, offered a genuine ability to combat de facto impunity.
Ultimately, the Court's decision privileged the status quo of impunity that has characterized
economic actors' investigations in the ordinary criminal justice system. To be clear about the
dimension of the impunity in Colombia, according to the 2020 Report on Preliminary Examination
Activities,52 the Colombian General Attorney informed the Office of the Prosecutor at the
International Criminal Court (ICC) that out of 2.683 cases related to third party actors, only there
48
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were 15 judgments, out of which 10 were convictions.53 Simply put, the corporate impunity related
to the conflict in Colombia overcomes 99.81%.
2.2. Rivers: Pollution and their Moral Contamination
“The war in Colombia has trampled the rivers to their full extent, as often happens on
battlefields”.54 As land, Colombian rivers and water streams have also been subjected to systems
of domination. They have been systematically polluted, but also morally or symbolically
contaminated. The World’s Water, a website dedicated to providing information to protect and
preserve fresh water, has tracked and categorized events related to water and conflict since the late
1980s.55 Between 1990 and 2019, 48 events took place in Latin America and the Caribbean, out
of which 20 occurred in Colombia and were associated with the armed conflict. An important part
of these events relate to dynamiting oil pipelines causing serious streams and rivers contamination,
as well as bombing water supplies, aqueducts, and treatment plants mostly by guerillas. Only in
2015, the oil spills into rivers put at risk the food and economic security of approximately 84,000
farmers, indigenous people, and fishermen who depend on these ecosystems; left 160,000
inhabitants without water, and caused irreparable damage to fauna and flora, threatening 30 species
of fish and 25 of mammals, some of them at risk of extinction, such as the tapir, the armadillo, the
leopard, the manatee, the ñeque and the white-tailed deer.56
Rivers have also been continuously poisoned with heavy metals as a consequence of legal
and illegal mining. Economic actors have pursued the extraction of Colombian gold. With a violent
and illegal initial extraction, companies then export it very easily outside of the country.57 The
Quito River, which twenty years ago was at the heart of one of the most biodiverse regions in the
world, is now the cause of death of children that result from intoxication with mercury-polluted
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water.58 Gold mining powered by mercury turns rivers into inhospitable places for fish, produces
an “irreversible damage” to the environment, and generates the “massive displacement of fauna.”59
Currently, it is estimated that due to mining processes, more than 80 rivers in Colombian are
polluted with mercury.60 For centuries, rivers in Colombia have been a route and refuge for
countless communities who have found in them sacred places, food, company, transportation, and
homes. Quite simply, rivers have been places where life flourishes. However, due to devices of
domination, “rivers have also been and are witnesses of the worst massacres in the history of the
armed conflict. Thousands of dead have rested in their waters and for years hundreds of
communities have mourned them.”61 Water streams have been stained by the forced
disappearance, a crime with staggering numbers in the country.62 Dumping persons and bodies
into rivers to disappear them was carried out by all actors of the conflict, but paramilitary groups
used this disappearing practice the most.
In just five rivers of the country (Magdalena, Cauca, Putumayo, Atrato, Sinú, and San
Jorge) 5.907 victims of forced disappearance have been confirmed .63 Finding them has been
almost an impossible task: 1,080 bodies have been recovered.64 Also, in the Chocó Region
(Buenaventura), communities have identified "clandestine mass graves" into the water, in estuaries
and mangroves – “acuafosas.” This type of violence has caused a moral or symbolic poisoning of
rivers. They were no longer a place where life flourished, but rather, a vehicle of death.
“Acuafosas” and “blood” rivers have caused fear, terror, and a wound in the relationship that afrocommunities had with their territories. Estuaries were the livelihoods for communities; they
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generated economic and food sustainability, and a space where families could spend weekends
and where young went swimming. But this changed: “One of my sons has problems going to sea
because when he goes fishing, he would see black bags spouting blood.”65 "The river has been
contaminated morally. How do you clean a river from its history? How do you take away from the
river the moral contamination it has carried?"66
2.3. (Ab)use of Animals in War67
Past and present exploitation of nature is the cause of human and non-human animal
displacement and harm. One could imagine that animals thrived in the jungle during the conflict
—in the space where law could not reach, and corporate extractivism was impossible—. However,
this depiction is highly utopic: in the nearly fifty years of internal conflict, FARC-EP was a severe
human presence in the jungle, and animals were displaced, battled, often eaten, feared, and
sometimes used as weapons for the war.
The war in Colombia took the lives of many human and non-human bodies. FARC-EP
killed animals to eat them and used them as weapons to attack their enemies. Becoming experts in
eating jungle animals meant making sure they could survive and be in a position of advantage
compared to other humans, who had no such training. But their relation to animals was originally
mediated by political views. In their initial political enterprise, before their project got deeply
entangled with the economy of drug trafficking, FARC-EP viewed animals as a way to assure
subsistence and independence for rural families.68 As Crespo analyzes, many questions remain
unanswered: “How many animals and whole species have been displaced from their territories?
What are the numbers of animals killed in bombardments or mines? How many animals have been
used as shooting practice, to desensitize the actors in the conflict to death and torture?”69 It was a
known practice for FARC-EP to use animals as bombs: “Animals, bicycles and corpses served as
65

Carolina Ávila Cortés y Valentina Parada Lugo. “Los mapas de la desaparición forzada en Buenaventura.” El
Espectador. April 30, 2021. Available at: https://www.elespectador.com/reportajes/los-mapas-de-la-desaparicionforzada-en-buenaventura/
66
Laura Cerón y Lorena Luengas. “Ríos colombianos: vertientes de vida y muerte”, November 30, 2019. Available
at: https://todoesciencia.minciencias.gov.co/opinion/rios-colombianos-vertientes-de-vida-y-muerte
67
This subsection is based on Ariza, Isabella, “Transition in Colombia: An Opportunity to Repair Animals in Cities
and Animals in War,” recipient of the Harvard Law School 2020 Animal Law and Policy Writing Prize, unpublished.
68
This conception of land ownership and animals rearises in the Peace Agreement of 2016: the only direct allusion to
animals in the Agreement is in regard to them being provided to families that used to cultivate illegal crops. Animals
as victims of war are left out of the Agreement. As property, FARC-EP demanded their more equal distribution
between owners and the campesinos who worked the land.
69
Crespo, Carlos A. “Territorios de paz para los animales y el ambiente”. El Turbión. 2 de junio de 2016. Available
at: https://elturbion.com/13421

13

explosives. Horses, donkeys, ambulances, balls and even the bodies of children ended up being
turned into bombs.”70
In territories where paramilitarism ruled, the setting is no longer the jungle. It is still rural
and far from the cities —far enough so that the absence of the state did not impact mainstream
society—, but semi-industrialized and quite populated (by persons that, in exorbitant amounts,
would become displaced). The actors are also different: paramilitarism arose as a phenomenon that
responded to the guerrilla’s force with harsh, private, illegal armies. In settlements that
paramilitary groups invaded, they brutally killed dogs that were spotted in the street after curfew,
and forced women to kill their animals and cook for them.
All armed actors of the Colombian conflict made slavery uses of the women’s bodies: they
used them to carry out chores and domestic tasks. In the case of paramilitary groups, “they stole
their animals and then forced them to cook them, they recruited them in situations of domestic and
sexual slavery.”71 Paramilitarism has a strong attachment to cattle raising,72 and the inhabitants of
Rincón del Mar (in the Atlantic Coast of Colombia) said that in the public meetings that
paramilitary leaders held to communicate their coercive rules and regulations, they referred to
them as ‘pigs’, ‘cattle’, ‘animals’. Additionally, paramilitaries had a number of reasons to kill
dogs: first, they wanted to eradicate the non-compliance of the curfew. Second, animals littered.
The kind of society that paramilitaries wanted to impose resembled a military dictatorship: “This
was much more related to the type of town, the social order desired by the paramilitaries (...) They
killed the dogs that were on the beach, so we had to tie them up.”73 Third, whenever paramilitaries
started a confrontation, dogs barked, alerting the presence of strangers. As soon as they barked,
paramilitaries shot them.
If FARC-EP used animals as weapons, paramilitaries used them as allied perpetrators. All
over the country, paramilitary leaders were trained to kill peasants using serpents, tigers,
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crocodiles, lions, snakes, caimans, vultures.74 This was a method meant to disappear the corpses
of their victims. A woman of Puerto Asís, in the Amazon of Colombia, remembered that in nearby
lakes “[Paramilitaries] had alligators. They said that they would feed us to those animals.”75 A
victim interprets this perverse practice as “a manifestation of not wanting to bury, but to
disappear,”76 but a paramilitary combatant confessed that they used rattlesnakes, one of the most
poisonous in the world, to murder peasants, because “as International Humanitarian Law says that
after three deaths there is a massacre, our purpose was no to be blamed for so many massacres.
We used snakes because these deaths were counted as accidents of nature.”77
The Declaration of the Women's Movement Against War in Putumayo stated: “The
Colombian Government must ensure and guarantee the right to human, animal and plant life!”78
This declaration proposes that human and non-human animals being part of a whole is essential,
not accessory, to peacemaking in Colombia. Animal cruelty, in war and outside of it, continues to
be battled through a punitive response. This is true both in Colombia and in the United States.79 In
a transitional justice regime, moving away from strictly anthropocentric and corporate-centric
solutions could bring reconciliation that transcends the criminal/innocent, city/jungle, and
human/nature dichotomies. By blurring these lines and through an adaptive ethics of mutual
avowal80, both FARC-EP ex-combatants and persons that incur in animal abuse could be reinserted
from the margins.
3. Accountability Beyond Transitional Justice
So far, this paper explored both the logic of domination and extractivism that characterized
the conflict and that subsists in the Colombian context. After mapping the lack of mechanisms for
corporate accountability and acknowledging the variety of harms infringed on bodies and nonhuman territories, we will explore what tools are under construction to address this impunity crisis.
This section examines the strategies that civil society and public interest lawyers have developed
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to advance accountability whether within the transitional justice institutions or beyond them. First,
it describes the efforts to hold corporations accountable in a post-conflict setting. This includes
strategies within transitional justice, such as relying on the Colombian Truth Commission, and
outside of it, such as activating civil law mechanisms to find redress for victims of corporate abuse.
Second, it examines innovations in the legal field such as the rights of nature and its consequences
for territories, rivers, and animals as victims of the armed conflict.
3.1. Seeking Corporate Accountability for Economic Actors
As described, the SJP does not have mandatory jurisdiction over economic actors, but
retains voluntary jurisdiction. Other transitional justice institutions such as the Colombian Truth
Commission could reveal the role of companies in the conflict.81 Because its mandate entails that
“in its process of clarifying, the Commission also studies the effects of the armed conflict on nature
and will seek to identify common patterns and their consequences,” it is expected that the final
report will include an analysis of the role that corporations played in the conflict.82 Transnational
companies enjoy the rights granted to them by legal regimes, but few of the responsibilities they
would have to assume if they were natural persons.83 Although at least nineteen truth commissions
have addressed corporate responsibility in their reports, and some have explicitly named economic
actors involved in the conflict, economic actors along supply chains often claim that others, not
them, are responsible for human rights violations.84 This is the case with energy companies that,
for example, after purchasing coal from multinational companies operating in Colombia, argued
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that the “complexity of the coal market” and the “fundamentals of competition law” meant that
coal could not “be traced back to the beginning of the mining operations or mining company/origin,
as this isn’t known at the time of purchase.”85 For years, the government promoted, rather than
regulated, extractive activities. As the size of companies or their production units decreased, their
influence in the management of the sector decreased as well. Hence, while large-scale industry has
a high amount of power and influence over all strategic decision-making processes, small and
medium-sized miners, informal miners, and ancestral and artisanal miners have little to no relation
to these niches and, consequently, obtain little benefit from public policy.86 These are the sorts of
findings that the Colombian Truth Commission should integrate and address to imagine adequate
guarantees of non-repetition.
Beyond transitional justice, in Colombia as in other parts of the world, civil society has had
an increasing interest in pursuing civil claims for human rights violations.87 Despite there being a
clear nexus between corporate behavior and damages, the law of many countries as well as
international law is ill fit to serve the interests of communities. Because of strict proof standards,
a narrow understanding of causation, and restricted notions of standing, proving the elements of
torts —or its equivalent in other jurisdictions—, which is hard enough during times of peace, turns
into an impossible task. If forcibly displaced, many communities focus on preserving their lives
and don’t have the time, the opportunity, or the tools, to gather evidence before they leave their
territory. If harassed or killed, community leaders and their families have trouble attributing the
conduct to companies because threats and bullets often come from hired assassins.88 And, if
negatively impacted by environmental harm, communities struggle with proving causation, while
companies hide behind formally valid environmental licenses and permits.
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For these and other reasons, corporate harm during conflict often goes unredressed. But
two years ago, the Colombian Supreme Court of Justice decided the Machuca case, an exception
to this rule and the only one of its kind in recent legal history in Colombia. The Court ordered that
an oil company had to pay economic and moral damages to the Machuca community, which was
affected by an oil spill that was the result of a bombing conducted by the National Liberation
Army, a guerrilla force. Considering the country’s conflict and the security measures that the
company did take, this case could have failed. The parties heavily discussed whether the armed
group’s conduct should exonerate the company from liability. Traditionally, in civil law
jurisdictions like Colombia, if an independent third party harms another person and there is no
vicarious liability, the defendant is usually off the hook. Here, the debate was more nuanced. Both
the circuit court and the Supreme Court focused on the fact that the company created the risk.
Although the company could have traced the pipeline elsewhere, it chose to trace it near the
community, and with this it created a risk that ended up materialized. Having created an
unnecessary risk, the company was responsible for the Machuca community’s damages. Despite
the causality chain being relatively long, the Court found the company liable. Other cases may fit
the pattern that the Machuca case followed. In cases in which companies deviate rivers, and this
deviation results in damages to communities, causation may be even easier to prove.
Civil law attorneys are continuously imagining ways to use civil litigation against
companies for their involvement in environmental and human rights violations during conflict.
Corporate Accountability Lab, a Chicago-based nonprofit, created a social lab precisely to share
experiences from Africa and Latin America in battles against companies for their behavior during
conflict. This social lab is a “cross-jurisdictional, cultural, and linguistic collaboration to protect
people and the planet from corporate abuse during conflict” and convenes “a diverse international
group of lawyers and community advocates working towards justice for victims.”89 Corporate
Accountability Lab also designed a civil litigation skill share exercise where Colombian attorneys
meet with Global North attorneys and discuss ways to use civil litigation to remedy harms tied to
corporate abuse during the conflict. According to their analysis, statute of limitations, the difficulty
of proving causation and finding impartial experts within the reach of the communities played an
important role in preventing the civil route from being the most common one for impacted
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communities. They are, however, exploring ways in which these obstacles can be surpassed in
order to use the ordinary law --and not transitional justice-- in favor of the communities.
3.2. The Rights of Nature: an Approach to Addressing the Harms to Territories, Rivers,
and Animals as Victims of Conflict
Despite the limitations of the transitional justice mechanisms, characterized by a persistent
anthropocentric approach that has hindered victimhood and comprehensive reparation for nonhumans' bodies and territories, some developments by the SJP have intended to fill this gap.
Currently, Colombian judges have recognized as “subjects of law” more than nine rivers,90
two national parks,91 and other ecosystems such as high-altitude wetlands (páramos)92 and the
Colombian Amazon rainforest.93 This ripple effect started in 2016, when a river —the first nonhuman body, was recognized as a “subject of rights.” Through Judgment T-622 of 2016, the
Constitutional Court of Colombia declared the Atrato River had “rights that imply its protection,
conservation, maintenance and ... restoration.”94 A tutela lawsuit,95 filed by ethnic communities of
the Atrato River, showed evidence that government entities had violated their fundamental rights
to their territory and culture. According to the plaintiffs, the lack of institutional control over illegal
90
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mining activities in the river that overlapped with their ancestral territories was threatening their
traditional ways of life. In the judgment, the Court highlighted the overlapping between illegal
mining in the Atrato River Basin and armed conflict: “the rise of illegal mining of gold and other
precious metals [in the Basin of the Atrato River and its tributaries] has opened up alarmingly—
as a financier of the armed conflict—which is generating worrying socio-environmental conflicts
that materialize in an indiscriminate struggle for the control of territories and natural resources.”96
As a result, the region and its communities endured forced displacement, the degradation of
ecosystems, the reduction of forests, extinction of endemic species and pollution of rivers, among
other factors that place the natural and cultural heritage of the country at high risk.97 Along with
these harms caused by illegal phenomena, the high court pointed out that “policies and legislation
have emphasized access for economic use and exploitation to the detriment of the protection of the
rights of the environment and of the communities.”98
“The Court recognized that the government failed to recognize the river as not only an
ecosystem but also as the territory that enabled communities to develop their cultural rights.
Accordingly, it failed to understand that there was a “biocultural” relationship between the river
and local communities worthy of constitutional protection. The legal solution was to recognize the
river as a subject of rights and to declare that it will be represented by a “Guardians’ Council”,
composed of one member of the plaintiff communities and one delegate of the Colombian State.
The Guardians’ Council represents and protects the river in all scenarios. This ruling is a creative
solution to socio-environmental problems. For years, the government had neglected the Atrato
River’s territories and marginalized its neighboring communities. Thus, through the creation of
the Guardians’ Council with decision making power, a novel forum that ordinary law does not
envision, community participation was strengthened, and an innovative form of environmental
governance was set up. Interestingly, this governance is in charge of the local population, whose
on-the-ground experiences and knowledge could provide valuable perspectives about more
appropriate and sustainable interactions with the Atrato River ecosystem”99:
Recognizing nature as a subject of law engenders making a claim for the dissolution of the
dualism between society and nature, a demand to implement alternatives to the fatigued
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discourse of development, and a vindication for regenerative systems instead of the
dominant growth economic model. Undoubtedly, the rights of nature expose the
anthropocentric perspectives of the environmental law and emphasize the need to imagine
and create [...] strategies that advocate for the indivisible and interrelated links between
people and nature.100
Given the recognition of “the rights of nature” for rivers and other non-human entities, one
may ask whether there is any possibility for ecosystems that endured negative impacts of war, to
be acknowledged as victims of the armed conflict. If so, could rivers, ecosystems or animals be
redressed and restored as a consequence of the harm suffered?
These questions and reflections seem to have resonated with the transitional justice
architecture. In recent years, the Investigation and Prosecution Unit of the Special Jurisdiction for
Peace declared the environment as “a silent victim of the armed conflict” in the framework of an
investigation carried out in the south of the country (Nariño Department). The Unit asserted “to be
seeking [environmental] reparation mechanisms and guarantees of non-repetition.”101
The rights of nature have already been mentioned in other Units of the SJP.102 But,
remarkably, transitional judges have recognized the malfunction of antagonism or dualism
between society and nature and have instead promoted a more intertwined conversation between
these worlds. They have emphasized the notion of territory as a victim.103 Territory refers to “a
living whole and sustenance of identity and harmony.” In accordance with indigenous ontologies,
“territory” denotes no separation between the material, the cultural, and the spiritual spheres, and
human and nonhuman are interrelated and interdependent.104 Based on this, the SJP, one of the
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most diverse tribunals in the world regarding gender and ethnicity,105 has issued several decisions
recognizing territories as victims of the armed conflict. According to recent decisions, the Katsa
Su and the Cxhab Wala Kile territories of the indigenous Awá and Nasa peoples, respectively,106
as well as territories of the afro-colombian communities from Tumaco, Ricaurte and Barbacoas107
municipalities are subjects of rights. These decisions have been accompanied by other recent ones
in the cases of Eperara Euja territory of Eperara Siapidaara people and other nine indigenous
people and communities.108
Although a close examination of the case law in Colombia shows that there is no unique,
standardized, or uniform content of the “rights of nature,” and several challenges remains in its
implementation, this approach might be a promising path to fill the gaps of transitional justice
mechanisms and guarantee justice, truth, reparations, and non-recurrence, also, for territories,
rivers, and animals.
Conclusion
This Article examined the effects that corporate abuse in post-conflict Colombia had and
continues to have over land, rivers and animals. The devices of dispossession, exploitation, and
domination were not eliminated after the signature of the Peace Agreement, and anthropocentric
and corporate-centric logics continue to dominate. Land grabbing, abuse of animals, material
pollution and moral or symbolic contamination of rivers were some of the mechanisms that reigned
during the war, many of which have not been eliminated. The very different types of personhood
that corporations and non-human bodies and territories enjoy have very real consequences: the
lack of incentives for economic actors to join the transitional justice regime is causing an impunity
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crisis, in which animals, rivers, and land remain unredressed. While corporate actors enjoy many
rights of legal personhood and few of the responsibilities they would have to face were they natural
persons, non-human bodies and territories face an ongoing battle to achieve protection through
some kind of personhood. Hence, this Article also explored the accountability efforts beyond and
within transitional justice mechanisms. Both national and international activists and attorneys have
been seeking corporate accountability for economic actors, and local law has made huge advances
in enhancing the rights of nature to addressing harms to territories, rivers, and animals as victims
of conflict. While human and non-human victims keep pointing at extractivism as one of the main
causes and effects of the war, legal and illegal corporate power continues to disguise these effects
through speeches of economic and human development. But the idyllic view of a post-conflict
Colombia, strongly in doubt after the wave of protests in the country,109 is increasingly raising
novel legal battles demanding protection and reparations. A post-conflict society must find a space
for those who it considers “wild”, and being worthy of state protection should be extended to the
life of every animal, to the life of every human, and to the lives that rivers have shared, enhanced,
and buried.
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